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THE SUPREME COURT’S DOUBLETHINK ON
ARBITRATION AND ADMINISTRATION
Paul R. Verkuil†
1984 was a dramatic year for literature and law. George Orwell’s
classic novel came of age, with its four Ministries of Peace, Love,
Plenty, and Truth that brilliantly described their opposites. 1 Less observed
that year—except by administrative lawyers—was the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the
case that was to recalibrate judicial review of agency decisions. 2 Also
decided that same year was Southland Corp. v. Keating, a case preempting
state arbitration laws that even administrative lawyers may have
ignored. 3
It is tempting to tie all three events together—since Orwell’s ministries
are, after all, agencies. But I will focus on the two decisions by the
Supreme Court. Taken together, they tell an unappreciated tale of doctrinal
contradiction—a kind of Orwellian “doublethink.”
The question for today is how did arbitration, an alternative decision
regime about which the Court knows little, become so favored that a
majority of justices have been willing to embrace it almost without question,
while administration, an established regime about which the Court knows a
lot, has been questioned to the point of being disfavored?4
Chevron is the well-known tale, as the most cited administrative law
case and the subject of endless discussion that has felled many trees.5 I
intend to leave most of that aside and focus on Chevron’s overarching purpose:
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to give agencies judicially delegated power to decide executive matters of
policy either initially or finally—the famous “two-step” process.6
Chevron supported the administrative state by recognizing that agencies
derive their power from the more democratic executive branch, subject to
the procedural protections contained in the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).7 That consensus, accepted by the Court’s liberals and conservatives
in the era of a conservative Reagan presidency, is increasingly breaking
down.8 Conservative justices now see flaws in administration not highlighted
since the early New Deal period. For example, in his dissent in City of
Arlington v. Federal Communications Commission, Chief Justice John
Roberts described agencies outside the “traditional executive departments”
as the “headless fourth branch of government.” 9
Indeed, scholars such as Philip Hamburger now openly postulate that
the entire administrative state is illegitimate, an argument not heard since
Roscoe Pound made it in the 1930s.10 This reactionary turn recasts Chevron
as an impediment to the Court’s jurisdiction over the administrative state. 11
Furthermore, Chevron’s influence is shrinking along with related cases
like Auer v. Robbins, which asks judges to defer to agency rules as well as
policy.12 At the same time, the Court is challenging the APA itself in new ways
such as how administrative law judges (ALJs) are appointed and controlled.13
In contrast with Chevron, Southland was a stealth administrative law
case decided in the same term. And it continues to live a charmed life. Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger’s majority opinion converted the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) into a regulatory statute by using it to set national arbitration
policy through the preemption of state law.14 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s
fiery dissent, joined by Justice William Rehnquist, argued that the FAA was
6
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a procedural statute only and not meant to foreclose state legal regimes. 15
“Although arbitration is a worthy alternative to litigation,” she wrote, “today’s
exercise in judicial revisionism goes too far.”16 Commentators have called the
majority opinion “extraordinarily disingenuous.”17
Southland’s impact on the Court’s jurisdiction has been enormous. By
preempting California law, it effectively allows mandatory arbitration to
defeat state remedies such as employee and consumer-based class actions.
But even though the resistance to Southland began among conservative
justices, the Court’s current conservatives have by all appearances undergone
a doctrinal conversion.18 Today, there is as much a Southland doctrine as a
Chevron doctrine, although discussion about it is not felling many trees. Let
us call this essay a falling sapling.
The Southland and Chevron doctrines have one thing in common: a
desire to reduce the judicial workload by resolving cases in alternative venues.
By endorsing arbitration as an alternative regime to litigation, Southland not
only legitimated the arbitral process but made arbitration an alternative to
administration as well.
This aspect of the FAA is less well understood. Imre Szalai, who has
done deep research into the FAA’s legislative history, calls the statute an
“evolutionary step in the rise of the administrative state where experts are
delegated the authority to handle complex problems.” 19 By equating
arbitration and administration, Szalai’s insight connects us back to the New
Deal period when procedural choices were hotly contested. But that was
before the APA, which, according to Justice Robert H. Jackson in Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, enacted “a formula upon which opposing social and
political forces have come to rest.”20
The mystery is this: Why has the Court seemingly opted procedurally
for the FAA while undermining the APA? The FAA is a bare bones statute.
Its key provision simply declares that arbitration agreements are “valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable” generally. 21 The FAA does not tell parties
how to do arbitration—it just says do it. It is not concerned about the quality
of the resulting arbitration nor with displacing the alternative regimes of
state law that regulate arbitration agreements.
The FAA makes no attempt to mimic the careful procedural regime set
up by the APA. This makes sense since arbitration, unlike administration
under the APA, is intended to be consensual, and whatever process two
equal parties agree to should suffice, whether it be a coin flip or a more formal
Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 22-23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 36.
17
Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 331, 380 (1996).
18
See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285-97 (1995) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
19
Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal Arbitration Act Through the Lens of
History Symposium, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 138 (2016).
20
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structure created by private groups such as the American Arbitration
Association.22 With arbitration, the parties get to choose their deciders, which
is something the administrative process—or the judicial, for that matter—
does not permit.
One can see why Congress in 1925 wanted the FAA to be accepted by
a then-reluctant judiciary. This time period was before the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and the courts were overwhelmed with a burgeoning
workload brought on by Prohibition cases.23 But the FAA was not a
sophisticated statute. It never anticipated the problem that arises when the
parties are not equal and arbitration is forced on the weaker one through
mandatory arbitration clauses. 24
In consumer and employment situations, states such as California have
tried to redress the balance through opt-outs and class actions under the
rubric of unconscionability.25 But once the Supreme Court favored arbitration
in Southland, lower courts have turned against these arguments. What
remains is an alternative decision regime endorsed by the Supreme Court
that procedurally comes nowhere near what the administrative process
offers in terms of fairness.
Favoring arbitration because of its effect on judicial workload has long
been appealing to overcrowded courts. 26 Unlike with administrative actions,
judicial dockets are permanently reduced once putative cases are sent to
arbitrators or, as happens more now, simply disappear. But this selfinterested desire on the part of federal courts to reduce dockets is no longer
supported by the facts. As Judith Resnick has shown, the federal courts’
fears of overwhelming filings in the 1990s were exaggerated—the estimates
were two-thirds higher than the actualities.27
Today, there is no caseload crisis. Moreover, even valid workload
arguments should not apply when states see the need for judicial action.
Preemption under the FAA eliminates state court resources that stand ready
to be deployed, based on state statutes that carefully question the consensual
basis for arbitration actions.28 The Supreme Court’s decision to let the FAA
“occupy the field” and preempt state law has drastic consequences for states
that want to monitor the fairness and efficacy of arbitration agreements and
the arbitrators who decide under them. The Court has effectively washed its
hands of concerns about both procedural and substantive rights arising in
this alternative decision regime.
See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, AAA DISPUTE RESOLUTION BD. HEARING RULES &
PROCEDURES (2000), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/AAA_Dispute_Resolution_Board_
Hearing_Rules_and_Procedures.pdf.
23
See, e.g., Szalai, supra note 19, at 138.
24
See IAN. R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW (1992).
25
Thomas V. Burch, Necessity Never Made a Good Bargain: When Consumer
Arbitration Agreements Prohibit Class Relief, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1004, 1005 (2004).
26
See Szalai, supra note 19, at 131.
27
Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private
in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, YALE L.J. 2804, 2910 (2015).
28
Id. at 2821.
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At the same time, the Court continues to disrupt the carefully
constructed procedural regime that the APA created in the years following
the New Deal. In a series of cases highlighted by Lucia v. SEC, the Court’s
concern with executive authority under Article II has jeopardized the APA’s
careful structure for the independence of ALJs.29 After Lucia established
ALJs as “inferior officers,” the President transferred jurisdiction to appoint
them from the Office of Personnel Management to the agencies directly.30
This shift in appointment authority has efficiency advantages but may well
have negative consequences for ALJ independence. 31
The judicial interest in micro-managing the administrative structure
continues with Seila Law v. CFPB, a case challenging single-headed
independent agencies, currently before the Court.32 The Court’s intense
focus on administrative structure is totally at odds with the dismissive
nature of its approach to the FAA’s traumatic effect on the arbitration field.
No case better illustrates the Court’s contrasting approaches to the
arbitral and administrative regimes than Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis.33 At
stake was an employee’s right to bring collective action for lost overtime
wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.34 The amounts were so small that
individual actions in arbitration—mandated by the employer’s agreement—
would never have proven a practical remedy. 35 Petitioners sought to use the
National Labor Relations Act’s NLRA) “concerted activities” clause to set
aside the restrictions on class actions in the arbitration agreement. The
Court, divided 5-4 with heated rhetoric from both sides, held that the FAA
protects employers from the administrative regime set up by the NLRA.
Justice Neil Gorsuch’s majority opinion refused to allow the elaborate
administrative system established under the labor laws to weaken the power
of the FAA’s application. 36 Even though the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) had ruled that the NLRA presented no fundamental conflict
with the FAA, Justice Gorsuch rejected the Board’s reasoning.37 He found
no Chevron deference, since the Board had no special expertise with the
FAA, and he dismissed the NLRB’s conclusion by noting that the NLRB
and the Solicitor General filed competing briefs on the issue.38 Once free of
deference to agency interpretation, the majority opinion granted the FAA
29

138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018); Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). See also
Matteo Godi, Administrative Regulation of Arbitration, 36 YALE J. REGUL. 853 (2019).
30
Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018); Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg.
32,755 (July 10, 2018).
31
Jack Beermann, The Future of Administrative Law Judge Selection, REGUL. REV.
(Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/10/29/beermann-administrative-lawjudge-selection.
32
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.
scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/seila-law-llc-v-consumer-financial-protection-bureau.
33
138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
34
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S. C. § 201-19 (1938).
35
Epic Systems Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
36
Id. at 1632 (majority opinion).
37
Id. at 1620, 1629.
38
Id. at 1630.
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equal status with the NLRA and used the FAA to defeat the long established
administrative structure surrounding labor relations.39
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in dissent, attacked the “egregiously
wrong” majority opinion on several fronts. 40 Her opinion, joined by Justices
Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor, discusses the 75-year
history of the NLRA and the labor movement. 41 It focuses on the movement
of the Court from cases upholding “yellow dog” contracts that prevented
employees from joining unions to its New Deal awakening and willingness
to uphold legislation protecting employees’ rights.42 She accused the majority
of returning to the Lochner era by denying plaintiffs a class action remedy
under the NLRA.43
Justice Gorsuch dismissed the Lochner charge by pointing out that
statutory interpretation of the FAA is not constitutional construction under
the Due Process Clause.44 He is correct theoretically, of course, since Congress
could amend the FAA to fix the case. In the current political environment,
however, any bill on this issue that emanates from the U.S. House of
Representatives will die quickly in the U.S. Senate. The reality is that, in
the current world of legislative gridlock, the difference between statutory
and constitutional interpretation has lost much of its practical effect.
Epic Systems stands for the proposition that the interests of the FAA and
arbitration clauses are stronger than the administrative structure undergirding
federal labor law. By choosing no structure over an established one, the
Court interpreted the FAA to deny substantive remedies either in state
courts or administrative forums. As a result, no forum is available to hear
the case. That outcome arises even though the NLRB has the power to
consider class relief and thus can satisfy basic labor law rights even while
leaving the preemption of state law standing.
Why would the Court prefer arbitration over access to administrative
solutions? It is hard not to see the Four Horsemen of Conservatism riding
again, joined by the Chief Justice as the Headless Horseman of the Fourth
Branch to make a fateful five. 45 Antipathy to administration has to be one
answer as to why the “rule” of arbitration has bested the rule of
administrative law—if not the rule of law itself.
Still, it is hard to see how this all evolved. Until Southland, preemption
has never been a conservative cause.46 But once the step was taken in
Southland, there seems to have been no turning back.
39

Id. at 1632.
Id. at 1633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
41
Id. at 1634-35.
42
Yellow dog contracts prevent employees from joining unions. The infamous Red
Jacket case upholding them, was authored by Judge Parker and cost him a seat on the
Supreme Court. See Casenote, Federal Arbitration Act and National Labor Relations Act,
132 HARV. L. REV. 427 (2018).
43
Epic Systems Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1635 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
44
Id. at 1630-32 (majority opinion).
45
Cf. Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559 (1997).
46
See Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019).
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The unsettled status of Chevron demonstrates that basic assumptions
about the allocation of administrative and judicial power are being
rethought. Is the FAA really an accidental accomplice in the reassessment
of the APA and the administrative state it helped legitimate? Or is it more a
part of the Court’s long held bias in favor of big business interests and
perhaps the larger project of rolling back the New Deal?47
Adam Cohen’s recent book, Supreme Inequality, charts a detailed
course for the Court in this direction that is deeply troubling, especially for
those who believe in neutral principles rather than judicial politics. 48 Is
“Equal Justice Under Law” still such a neutral principle?

47

See Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017).
48
ADAM COHEN, SUPREME INEQUALITY (2020).

